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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16974 
This was an action by plaintiffs for specific 
performance of real estate contract for two residential lots 
or for damages against the defendant-third-party plaintiff 
who interpleaded against third-party defendants for damages, 
and the latter claim no obligation to provide said lots. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The third-party defendant, L. A. Campbell, seeks 
reversal of the judgment as against L. A. Campbell. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs are daughters of B. 0. Brough, deceased. 
The decedent's estate, on December 16, 1970, .contracted by 
Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit A) to sell 22 acres of 
land at $3,000 per acre to Barton Brothers Investment Corpora-
tion. The agreement further provided that: 
"Buyer shall have the option of buying or 
refusing to buy the acreage west of the oil 
pipe line except that seller shall have the 
option of retaining one lot west of said pipe-
line, to be adjusted in said payment due June 
1, 1975." 
The June l, 1975 payment was to be the balance due under the 
contract. By Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated 
June 7, 1974 (Exhibit 1) Barton agreed to sell to Campbell 
property situated "east of Center Street, Kaysville, Utah, for 
$8,500 per acre for approximately 36 acres-50 acres to be 
determined by survey", payable $100 down and the balance on 
delivery of deed on or before July 1, 1974, and no exceptions 
or reservations were mentioned in Exhibit 1. 
On July 29, 1974, Barton as seller contracted with 
plaintiffs (Brough daughters) by Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase (Exhibit B) to sell property described as 
"2 lots to be chosen in Grand Oaks East 
subdivision to be recorded by Kaysville City. 
A part of the B. 0. Brough estate. Pick of 
lots to be done within 10 days after recording." 
The purchase price was stated to be $5,000 payable $1.00 down 
and the balance of $4,999 due 30 days after completion of 
- 2 -
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offsite improvements in the subdivision immediately adjacent 
to said lots on the "base of $2,500 per lot". 
A warranty deed from the Brough estate signed also by 
plaintiffs as granters to Barton Brothers Investment Corporation 
as grantee, dated July 15, 1974, was recorded July 30, 1974, 
(Exhibit 4). This warranty deed described the same 22 acres 
as set forth in the 1970 contract, Exhibit A, but made no 
exceptions, limitations or reservations. 
Barton, by warranty deed dated July 18, 1974, 
recorded July 30, 1974, conveyed the same 22 acres to Golden 
West Development, Inc., again without any reservations or 
qualifications (Exhibit 3). L.A. Campbell was a principal 
stockholder in Golden West along with Wayne Parkin and John 
Duncan. Golden West caused the 22 acre plat to be platted 
as "Grand Oaks, Plat A" in Fruit Heights City, Davis County, 
Utah, which was recorded June 24, 1976. 
James H. Brough, a brother of the plaintiffs, is a 
owner-broker of Brough Realty in Kaysville, Utah, and testified 
that he notified Barton of his deceased father's desire to have 
his sisters obtain lots in the Brough property, and that Jim 
drew up the Earnest Money Agreement on July 29, 1974, at the 
time of closing the Brough estate contract with Barton, in 
the presence of Gordon Gurr, Barton, and his sister, Vilate 
(Tr 12). Jim said that at closing $2,000 was credited to Barton 
for the two lots his sisters were to get, calculated as 2/3 of 
an acre at $3,000 per acre (Tr 14). Brough did not know of any 
sale by Barton to Golden West until after April, 1976 (Tr 15), 
- 3 -
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when he saw a preliminary plat of the property. The plat, 
(Exhibit E) shows a preparation date of January 1976; owner's 
dedication May 27, 1976, by Golden West Development, Inc., by 
L. S. Campbell and Wayne F. Parkin; a city council of Fruit 
Heights City approved June 1, 1976; and a recording on June 
24, 1976. Jim testified that within about three to four weeks 
after April 23, 1976, he had conversations with Campbell and 
Parkin (Tr 16) and was informed by Parkin that the latter 
claimed no obligation to furnish the two lots; whereupon 
Brough called Barton and was advised that there was a mis-
understanding and that Barton would see that those lots were 
delivered. Brough also claimed that his sisters had selected 
Lots 9 and 10 and were so marked in Brough's office and 
communicated verbally to Campbell and Parkin by Brough's agent. 
However, he acknowledged that Parkin said that Lot 9 was 
already sold. This brings in a conflict as to the time Brough 
made a selection in that Parkin's records showed that Lot 9 
was sold February 8, 1977 (Tr 126) so the conversation with 
Brough was after February 8, 1977, in which event the Broughs 
did not make a selection within ten days after the recording 
date of June 24, 1976. Brough said that in his intital con-
versations with Campbell, his impression was that: 
"At least there was hope of honor. I don't know I 
would say yes, we are honoring that, I'm not con-
veying that. He seemed to be aware of the trans-
action, some of the background to it, and gave me 
hope that yes, he was working with us." (Tr 29) 
- 4 -
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Brough said he did not have reason to believe otherwise until 
Wayne Parkin called. Brough admitted that he never personally 
advised Parkin (whose Secure Realty was handling the lots) that 
the two lots had been sold, but only indicated this on Brough's 
own chart in Brough's office. 
Brough also admitted that Lots 9 and 10 in the 
recorded plat are situated east of the pipeline, whereas Brough 
intended "to pick west of the pipeline" (Tr 35). The land west 
of the pipeline is in Kaysville City (Tr ~6), the land east of 
the pipeline was in the county until annexed by Fruit Heights 
and Brough assumed that the plat Brough's were interested in 
would be recorded by Kaysville City (Tr 38). Brough had 
indicated that in April 1976 he had marked Lots 9 and 10 on a 
copy of a subdivision plat marked Exhibit D, but when it was 
called to his attention that Exhibit D was signed by the city on 
June 1, 1976, Brough hedged that it may have been another plat 
which he could not locate (Tr 46). Brough also admitted on 
cross-examination that he did not know whether his first conver-
sation with Campbell was before or after June 1, 1976 (Tr 47), 
and that his first conversation with Parkin was when Parkin 
told Brough that Lot 9 had already been sold (Tr 49). 
Erough testified that the $5,000 for the two lots 
was never tendered "because the lots were sold prior to the, 
to that date of tendering". The plaintiffs' complaint alleges 
a tender. Attorney Rodney Page, by letter dated February 4, 
- 5 -
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1977, to Barton advises Barton of the selection of Lots 9 and 
10, and that Brough had been trying to work the matter out with 
Campbell but was unable to resolve the matter (Exhibit F). Page 
commenced suit on October 12, 1977, against one defendant, Barton 
Brothers Investment Corporation. On February 27, 1978, Barton 
moved to bring in Golden West and Campbell as third-party 
defendants. The Third-Party Complaint alleges: 
"5. Defendant and third-party plaintiff 
purchased the twenty-three acres above mentioned 
in 1970 and at that time agreed to permit -· Violate 
B. McDonald and Evelyn Brough, plaintiffs herein, 
to select two lots from said twenty-three acres 
upon the subdivision of the tract. A Uniform Real 
Estate Contract provided that the plaintiffs would 
pay defendant and third-party plaintiff the same 
price tendered by defendant and third-party 
plaintiff for equivalent ground in the 1970 
transaction. 
6. Third-party defendant, L. A. Campbell, 
was informed by Jay Golden Barton of the afore-
mentioned agreement, permitting the plaintiffs to 
select two lots from the twenty three acre tract. 
7. At the closing of the purchase of the 
said twenty-three acres by the third-party defen-
dants, L. A. Campbell acknowledged the aforementioned 
agreement between the plaintiffs and defendant and 
third-party plaintiff as part of the entire purchase 
and further agreed that the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract referred to above, would be assumed and 
honored by the third-party defendants. 
8. In connection with the closing, the third-
party defendants withheld payment to defendant and 
third-party plaintiff on one acre of the twenty-
three acre tract in order to assure clearance of 
the original owners. Such payment remains untendered 
and in escrow at the Farmers State Bank at Woods 
Cross, Davis County, Utah. 
9. Third-Party defendants have subsequently 
developed and sold most, if not all, of the ground 
within the twenty-three acres. 
10. Third-party defendants have failed to 
provide two lots for the plaintiffs as agreed in 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract originally entered 
into by defendant and third-party plaintiff and 
subsequently assumed by the third-party defendants. 
- 6 -
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Said actions of the third-party defendants were 
intentional and fraudulent on the part of the 
defendant and third-party plaintiff and as a 
result thereof said third-party defendants should 
be liable for court costs, attorneys' fees and 
punitive damages sustained by said defendant and 
third-party plaintiff." 
Golden West and Campbell answered the third-party complaint by 
denying the above allegations except Paragraph 9, and alleged 
as an affirmative defense that the claim was barred by the statute 
of frauds contained in Title 25, Chapter 5, Section l. 
The trial court made an open court ruling, the 
initial part of which is as follows: (Tr 183-185) 
COURT'S RULING 
"THE COURT: As to the defendant, Golden West 
Development, Inc., one of the third-party defendants, 
the Court finds no cause of action. I find nothing 
that would bring them into this. It's a separate 
entity, though maybe Mr. Campbell's ultra-ego. That 
certainly hasn't been broughtout here and I find no 
cause of action against Golden West Development, Inc. 
The Court has wide latitude. We have from 
the spring of '76 until the spring of '77, as to when 
the notice came out. I can just flip a coin and find 
out when this notice went out, I guess, that's how 
far apart the testimony is. 
The Court thinks it's more reasonable to 
believe that the finding of the plat in it's pre-
paration and the sale as uncontested by Mr. Brough, 
that it was sometime in the spring of "76, is the more 
reasonable date and the Court finds that notice was 
given at that date. 
There seems to be a feeling that the plaintiffs 
should have gone and completed their performance before 
it was able to do so. The completion of the project, 
the off-site improvements as testified to in the fall 
of "77 as I recall. 
The Court finds a Judgment against the defendant, 
J. Golden Barton -- no, the Barton Brothers Investment 
Company, and order specific performance. If that is 
- 7 -
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not possible, and I understand it is not but I 
think that's an alternative that the Court must do, 
then the Court finds the damages in the sum of 
$22,900. That's the only figures before me. Plus, 
$1,450.00 attorney's fees and costs of the court. 
The Court finds that the actions of the 
plaintiff were with due diligence, and was reason-
able. That the law would not expect them to offer 
the $5,000 to the owners of the property when they 
had been informed that he absolutely wasn't going to 
convey it. The testimony, and it's not refuted, was 
that they stood ready, willing and able to pay that 
at any time. 
The Court has a more difficult time with Mr. 
Campbell. Mr. Campbell's own testimony was that he 
knew of the agreement, he entered into an agreement, 
and indicated that sometime down the line they would 
take care of it, indicating to the Court that he 
felt he had a responsibility. He knew of the agree-
ment, and then the question rises, does this take 
it out of the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of 
Frauds, of course, indicating that the land must, 
any contract dealing with land, must be in writing 
unless it falls within one of the exceptions. 
The Court does find that this does fall in 
one of the exceptions, that Mr. Campbell does have 
a responsibility in that the agreement that he 
entered into and testified to as did Mr. Barton, 
took place prior to the granting of the deed and 
with discussions thereafter. The Court takes to 
mean that they would take care of it somewhere down 
the line, meant that the Broughs would receive that 
which they have contracted to receive and find for 
the plaintiffs and against the defendant, L. A. 
Campbell, the sum of $22,900 in damages, $1,450.00 
attorneys' fees and costs of court. 
The Broughs might understand they are not 
to get that twice, that's to be as between Mr. 
Campbell and Mr. Barton, the defendant Barton 
Brothers Investment Corporation." 
Formal Findings of Fact were subsequently filed, 
which recited that the Barton-Brough transaction was closed on 
July 29, 1974 at which time Barton gave plaintiffs the choice of 
two lots to be chosen within ten days of recording of the plat 
- 8 -
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which was recorded in "the spring of 1976" and plaintiffs gave 
notice to Barton of the selection "in the spring of 1976"; that 
plaintiffs were ready and willing at all times to pay $5,000 for 
improvements on the lots which were completed in the fall of 
1977; that the lots in 1976 were selling for $13,950 each; that 
Barton sold the land to third-party defendant in July 1974, 
subject to the contractual rights of plaintiffs to select two 
lots as provided in the contract, which was dated December 16, 
1970; that at the time of closing between Barton and Golden West 
the sum of $8,500 belonging to Barton was retained in escrow; 
that Campbell verbally agreed with Barton to provide plaintiffs 
with two lots called for in the contract dated December 16, 1970; 
and that although the Campbell agreement was "verbal in nature, 
the Court finds that Barton Brothers Investment Corporation fully 
performed their obligations under the verbal agreement, which 
performance constitutes an exception to the Statute of Frauds, 
which requires that contracts for sale of real property be in 
writing." 
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs 
against Barton, ordering Barton to forthwith convey the two lots 
to plaintiffs who are to pay $2,500.00 per lot for improvements, 
or in the alternative for judgment against Barton for $27,900 
less $5,000 for improvements, and similarly judgment was entered 
against Campbell to convey the lots or to pay Barton $27,900 
less $5,000. The $8,500 in escrow was ordered returned to Barton 
- 9 -
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unless Campbell paid the judgment in which event Campbell woulJ 
get the $8,500. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE IS NOT 
AVAILABLE IN AN ACTION AT LAW FOR 
MONETARY DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF AN ORAL 
CONTRACT TO CONVEY LAND. 
Appellant contends there was no oral contract by 
him to convey the two lots, but assuming the existence of an 
oral agreement which was otherwise sufficiently definite and 
certain to be enforceable in an equitable action of specific 
performance for conveyance of land because of part performance 
by the obligee, nevertheless, part performance is not available 
in the alternative remedy for damages. 
In Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P2d 570 
(1953), Justice Wolfe in an opinion which reversed the trial 
court's judgment for specific performance, added under conrrnents 
13 and 14: 
"The second count in the complaint is an action 
at law for money damages; however, plaintiff cannot 
obtain relief on that basis. It is well settled in 
this jurisdiction that the doctrine of part perform-
ance is not available in an action for damages on an 
oral contract to convey land. Baugh v. Darley, 112 
Utah 1, 184 P2d 335." 
This holding was reaffirmed in the case of McKinnon v. Corpora-
tion, Etc., Latter-Day Saints, 529 P2d 434 (Utah 1974). In this 
trial court's oral opinion, he stated that he ordered specific 
- 10 -
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performance against Barton but, 
"If that is not possible, and I understand it is 
not but I think that's an alternative that the Court 
must do, then the Court finds the damages in the sum 
of $22,900." (Tr 184, lines 15-18) 
Then as to Campbell the Court stated that the transaction was an 
exception to the Statute of Frauds and "find for the plaintiffs 
and against the defendant, L. A. Campbell, the sum of $22,900 in 
damages, $1, 450 attorney's fees and costs of the Court." (Tr 185, 
Line 12-14) 
The written judgment in Paragraph 1 orders specific 
performance by Barton and payment by plaintiffs of $2,500 per 
lot; Paragraph 2 is an "alternate judgment" against Barton for 
$27,900 less $5,000 and $1,450 attorney's fees against Barton 
and Campbell; Paragraph 3 is a judgment for Barton against 
Campbell for specific performance upon payment of $2,500 per lot; 
and Paragraph 4 "in the alternative, awards Barton judgment 
against Campbell for $27,900 less $5,000 and for costs. 
It is clear that the "alternate" judgment is for 
money damages for breach of an oral agreement to convey land and 
is not permissible. 
The pleadings did not allege an equitable action. 
Plaintiffs complaint named only Barton as defendant, and recited 
an agreement of July 29, 1974, whereby Barton agreed to convey the 
lots, that the plaintiffs have tendered $4,999 and defendant failed 
and refused to provide said lots as agreed. The prayer of the 
Complaint was: 
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complaint was: 
"l. For an Order of the Court requiring the 
defendants to provide to the plaintiffs the lots 
as agreed in the agreement. 
2. In the alternative for judgment against 
the defendants in an amount equal to the present 
value of the lots in question, together with 
interest thereon at the legal rate." 
The prayer thus requests equitable relief in No. 1 and legal 
relief in No. 2. However, the third party complaint which is 
detailed supra pages 6 and 7 contains no equitable allegations 
and in fact in Paragraph 10 alleges that the failure of Golden 
West and Campbell to provide two lots for plaintiff was inten-
tional and fraudulent "and as a result thereof said third-party 
defendants should be liable for court costs, attorneys' fees and 
punitive damages sustained by said defendant and third-party 
plaintiff". The complaint did not call for punitive damages 
against Barton, so it is assumed that the third-party complaint 
really intended that Campbell be liable for punitive damages and 
not "punitive damages sustained" by Barton as alleged. The 
prayer of the third-party complaint was for (1) what plaintiffs 
may recover from Barton; (2) the sum of $5,000 as "the value of 
one acre for which payment was initially withheld; (3) for the 
sum of $10,000as punitive damages, and (4) for cost of court and 
attorney's fees. 
Also, the judgment granting plaintiffs money damages 
against Campbell was improper for the reasons above stated and 
for further reason that plaintiffs prayed no relief against 
- 12 -
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Campbell who in fact was not a party to the Complaint and had 
no dealings with plaintiffs. 
6, 7 and 8: 
POINT II 
THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE AS 
EXCLUDING THE OPERATION OF THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS IS EXTREMELY LIMITED. 
We quote from Ravarino v. Price, supra, connnents 
"The doctrine is to be applied with great care, paying 
particular attention to the policy expressed in the 
statute of frauds and historical precedent where the 
limits have been defined by the process of inclusion 
and exclusion. In Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 
767, 772, 8 L.R.A.,N.S., 870, this court said: 
'Courts of equity, in establishing the doctrine 
invoked by plain tiff, have not, by any means:, 
intended to annul the statute of frauds, but only 
to prevent its being made the means of perpetrating 
a fraud. In order that a plaintiff may be per-
mitted to give evidence of a contract not in writing, 
and which is in the very teeth of the statute and 
a nullity at law, it is essential that he establish 
[in equity], by clear and positive proof, acts and 
things done in pursuance and on account thereof, 
exclusively referable thereto, and which take it 
out of the operation of the statute. 1 
And in Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 135 
N.E. 273, 274, the Court of Appeals of New York, 
through Mr. Justice Cardozo announced: 'The peril 
of perjury and error is latent in the spoken promise. 
Such, at least, is the warning of the statute, the 
estimate of policy that finds expression in its 
mandate. Equity, in assuming what is in substance 
a dispensing power, does not treat the statute as 
irrelevant, nor ignore the warning altogether. It 
declines to act on words, though the legal remedy 
is imperfect, unless the words are confirmed and 
illuminated by deeds. ' . . . . 
[7] A careful analysis of the cases will aid 
in defining what constitutes part performance in 
the framework of the facts of the instant case. The 
act relied upon by plaintiff to invoke the doctrine 
is the purchase of a strip of land to be used as a 
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railroad spur in conjunction with the land which 
Mr. Price orally promised to convey. The doctrine, 
in its broadest scope, is that acts will constitute 
sufficient part performance if they are clearly 
referable to some contract existing between the 
parties, in relation to the subject matter in 
dispute, and as a result of these acts, the 
plaintiff has been defrauded. . . . A less liberal 
view is that the term 'part performance' is to be 
taken literally, and the performance must be some-
thing required in the identical contract. 
This doctrine has found little support because 
many of the strongest cases, those where improvements 
have been erected on the land by a plaintiff in 
possession, do not involve any part performance at 
all, literally speaking. . . . It is also essential 
that the parol agreement or gift should be estab-
lished by clear, unequivocal and definite testimony, 
and the acts claimed to be done thereunder, should 
be equally clear and definite and referable 
exclusively to the contract or gift. 
[8-10] It is to be noted that possession by 
the plaintiff is regarded as an important fact, 
one which is generally directly referable to the 
contract, and when combined with permanent and 
valuable improvements which are representative 
of the existence of an oral contract, virtually 
every jurisdiction will grant specific performance." 
The written Findings of Fact with respect to the 
alleged oral contract are contained in Paragraphs 16 and 17 
thereof as follows: 
"16. That the defendant Campbell verbally agreed 
with Barton Brothers Investment Corporation to provide 
plaintiffs with the two lots called for in the contract 
dated December 16, 1970, provided plaintiffs made their 
selection and paid the monies called for therein. 
17. That although the agreement between Barton 
Brothers Investment Corporation and Campbell was 
verbal in nature, the Court finds that Barton 
Brothers Investment Corporation fully performed their 
obligations under the verbal agreement, which per-
formance constitutes an exception to the Statute of 
Frauds, which requires that contracts for the sale of 
property be in writing." 
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The said "Findings of Fact" are more characteristic of conclu-
sions of law. It is to be noted that the said findings and the 
third-party complaint both ref er to the contract dated December 
16, 1970, which was the Uniform Real Estate Contract, Exhibit A, 
between the Brough Estate (including plaintiffs) as seller and 
Barton Brothers Investment Corporation. The 1970 agreement gave 
Barton the option to buy acreage west of the pipeline, and gave 
Brough the "option of retaining one lot west of said pipeline, 
to be adjusted in said payment due June 1, 1975". Plaintiffs 
complaint was for two lots pursuant to the July 29, 1974 agree-
ment, Exhibit B, from a named subdivision in Grand Oaks East 
Subdivision in Kaysville City. Golden West developed the property 
east of the pipeline under the name of Grand Oaks subdivision, and 
plaintiffs claimed to have selected Lots 9 and 10 thereof which 
were east of the pipeline and in Fruit Heights, not Kaysville City. 
Campbell's agreement with Barton, Exhibit 1, dated 
June 7, 1974, makes no exceptions or references to any other 
agreements and obligates Barton to furnish good and marketable 
title. Barton did not contract directly with plaintiffs until 
July 29, 1974. By warranty deed dated July 18, 1974, recorded 
July 30, 1974, Barton deeded the 22 acres to Golden West without 
any restrictions or reservations. 
The trial court's oral opinion relating to the oral 
agreement and its effect stated: (Tr 184-185) 
"The Court has a more difficult time with Mr. 
Campbell. Mr. Campbell's own testimony was that 
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he knew of the agreement, he entered into an 
agreement, and indicated that sometime down the 
line they would take care of it, indicating to 
the Court that he felt that he had a responsibi-
lity. He knew of the agreement, and then the 
question rises, does this take it out of the 
Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds, of 
course, indicating that the land must, any contract 
dealing with land, must be in writing unless it falls 
within one of the exceptions. 
The Court does find that this does fall in one of 
the exceptions, that Mr. Campbell does have a 
responsibility in that the agreement that he entered 
into and testified to as did Mr. Barton, took place 
prior to the granting of the deed and with discus-
sions thereafter. The Court takes to mean that they 
would take care of it somewhere down the line, meant 
that the Broughs would receive that which they have 
contracted to receive and find for the plaintiffs and 
against the defendant, L. A. Campbell, the sum of 
$22,900 in damages, $1,450.00 attorney's fees and 
costs of the court." 
Thus neither the formal findings which were conclusions regarding 
an entirely different agreement dated December 16, 1970, or the 
courts oral opinion point to any clear oral agreement, but on 
the contrary indicate a confusion even as to the general nature 
of the oral agreement. Barton testified that his agreement with 
Campbell about the lots for the Brough girls was prior to closing 
date of August 18 and after his July 29, 1974 agreement with 
Brough (Tr 89-90). In which event he was already obligated to 
give Campbell clear title under the June 7, 1974 agreement and 
had in fact deeded the land free and clear by deed dated July 18, 
1974, recorded July 30, 1974. Barton's only performance was 
what he was obligated by written contract to perform. The trial 
court, during Barton's testimony, also expressed his concern 
over the Statute of Frauds and part performance as follows: 
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"THE COURT: The difficulty I have here, Mr. 
Smedley, is where is the part performance? I'm, 
I haven't seen anv documents. The documents 
apparently refer ~ot at all to this two-way agree-
ment or innuendoes. 
MR. SMEDLEY: Well the part performance is by 
deed in that we had property that was under contract 
to Mr. Barton. By deed -- he transferred all of his 
interest to Mr. Campbell. Campbell now has the 
property and as a result of our performance, totally, 
we are now entitled to explain what the agreement was 
between the parties in that regard. 
THE COURT: I have a tough time getting that out 
of the Statute of Frauds. The conveyance of the 
property would not, and if you have some law on that 
I would be glad to have that. Just the deeding of 
property would not do that. 
MR. SMEDLEY: I think that it would, Your Honor, 
because I think the deeding of the property is the 
performance. 
THE COURT: In order to get it out of the Statute 
of Frauds, Mr. Smedley, don't you have to have some 
indicia of an agreement, and we are talking about an 
agreement of conveying the property to some third-
party in the case of you and Mr. Fadel's client. It's 
not even an agreement as between the two of you, but 
to be conveyed for the benefit of some third party who 
is in a previous agreement situation with your client. 
MR. SMEDLEY: Well, I don't know. 
THE COURT: Don't you have to have some indication 
that there is an agreement?" 
Nothing in the subsequent testimony, admitted over 
objection of counsel, appeared to answer the concerns expressed 
by the trial court as quoted above. In fact, the Court again 
(Tr 94) asked Barton's counsel how he could get around the Statute 
of Frauds' stating: 
"THE COURT: Well, in other words, we have got to 
have something that ties it down. Checks, notes, 
memoranda, something with signatures on it to indicate 
an acknowledgment, as I understand the Statute of 
Frauds before that can be brought out. 
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MR. SMEDLEY: Well, I don't know that it has to 
be anything with signatures on. 
THE COURT: What would prevent me from putting up 
any kind of a document there is and saying here is 
a document and this says such and such, and no 
signatures, no acknowledgment, or no nothing?" 
Then at (Tr 106) the Court stated that the document 
did not appear to be ambiquous as as to allow parole evidence in 
view of the Statute of Frauds. 
Campbell was called to testify by Barton and testified 
in substance that before he bought the property he mad~ an agree-
ment with Barton "that down the road I was going to make an agree-
ment to take care of the two lots" (Tr 136). However, the 
agreement as to two lots did not arise until July 29, 1974, as 
reviewed in the statement of facts, so the discussion as to the 
two lots would have been after July 29, 1974. And while Campbell 
may not have been clear as to the time, he was clear that the only 
agreement with respect to the Brough lots was that it would have 
to "be worked out", but it was never mentioned how it would be 
worked out (Tr 137). Campbell said it was up to Barton to negotiate 
with Golden West to buy the lots for the Brough sisters and Barton 
never did (Tr 141). Barton was recalled by his counsel. Appellant 
objected to any oral testimony that went beyond explanation of 
negotiations and contended that the Statute of Frauds is substantive, 
not just procedural (Tr 151-152). Over objections of appellant, 
the Court allowed Barton to testify. Barton said that "in the 
preliminary closing meeting" at Farmers State Bank, August 30th, 
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he met Campbell (Tr 153) and told him that Barton had exercised 
his option with Brough for the land west of the pipeline, and 
that the girls were to select two lots_ and Barton escrowed 
$8,500 to cover the cost of the ground (Tr 154). When asked 
what, if any, comment did Mr. Campbell make in this regard, Barton 
answers: "He said that he understood that it was, he said 
that because of the necessity of exercising the option on the 
ground west of the pipeline he would honor that agreement"(Tr 154 
line 27-2~). 
Appellant moved to strike the Barton testimony which 
was denied by the Court. It is to be noted that Barton had 
already made a deal with Brough in exercising his option and 
granting the sisters the right to select two lots before asking 
Campbell to honor the agreement, but after Campbell had acquired 
the property by Earnest Money Agreement June 7, 1974, and deed 
recorded July 30, 1974. However, on cross-examination, Barton 
changed the date of his conversation with Campbell from August 
30th to July 30th (Tr 156). Later, as shown by testimony at 
(Tr 166-167) Barton said the only reason for the July 29, 1974 
agreement with the sisters was to satisfy his obligation under 
the 1970 Uniform Real Estate Contract, and when asked if Campbell 
had ever committed himself in writing to any reservations or 
exceptions, Barton replied: "At the closing, he felt that he 
had." (Tr 166 line 19). But Barton contended this would have 
been July 30 even though the unsigned closing statement, Exhibit 2 
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is dated August 18, 1974. When asked why he didn't demand a 
written agreement from Campbell the same as Brough required on 
July 29, 1974, Barton replied that he felt that the escrow agent 
"would pass that on in title insurance or in title information 
to Mr. Campbell, and that that would serve as the instrument of 
agreement, that the title record would do that, on the title 
insurance" (Tr 167 lines 3-8). 
Even allowing the oral testimony, it is clear that 
at most, Campbell indicated verbally, after he bought the 
property and had no obligation with respect to the said lots, 
that he would work something out down the road. 
Nothing reviewed in this point or known to be in the 
transcript shows anything like a part performance or any per-
formance by Barton relating to an alleged oral agreement by 
Campbell to convey two lots to Broughs. Bartons only performance 
was fulfilling his legal obligations under his written contract 
with Campbell for which Barton was paid in full. This court, 
in Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P2d 1319, under Comment 
7, stated: 
"[7] Plaintiff also claims, in the alternative, 
that the oral agreement is removed from the statute 
of frauds due to the equitable principle of part 
performance, which is part of our law by statute, 
and decision-. The observations just made pertaining 
to oral modification also apply here. The payments 
referred to could well be regarded as payments on 
the written contract and they do not unequivocally 
relate to any oral contract." 
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POINT III 
ASSUMING THAT CAMPBELL ORALLY PROMISED TO 
DEED LOTS TO PLAINTIFFS, THIS PROMISE WAS 
WITHOUT CONSIDERATION AND IS NOT AN 
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT APART FROM THE STATUTES 
OF FRAUD. 
Viewing Barton's testimony most favorably, any oral 
agreement, whatever its terms, came on or after July 30, 1974, 
"at the closing". The unsigned closing statement was dated August 
18, 1974. Barton was already obligated as of June 7, 1974, to 
convey the land. Any promise by Campbell to deliver two lots to 
be "chosen" by plaintiffs was without consideration. Campbell 
received nothing for such an alleged promise. 
An analysis of the transaction related by Barton 
reveals that Broughs lost no money, Barton gained profit, and 
Campbell would have lost money. Broughs had already retained 
$3,000 from Barton for one acre of land, whether to adjust for 
survey deficiencies or otherwise. Barton was selling to Campbell 
over 22 acres at $8,500 per acre which Barton bought in 1970 
for $3,000 per acre. Barton's purported escrow with the bank of 
$8,500 for one acre to cover the Brough selection amounts to 
giving Broughs the right to buy back their choice of a developed 
22 acres at Campbell's average cost of $8,500 per acre. This is 
a loss to Campbell in many ways. It is common knowledge that 
although a larger tract of 22 acres might be purchased at $8,500 
per acre, yet to buy just one acre even before development would 
conrrnand a much greater price. If Campbell's actual cost of 
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improvements were estimated to be $2,500 per lot, and he was 
required to sell them to Broughs just for the cost of improve-
ments and his actual average cost of the raw ground, he would 
get nothing for his effort in getting the land annexed, sub-
divided and improved, would lose money on his actual cost of the 
selected acreage, and would have carried the expense of his 
investment from August 18, 1974 until late 1977 without any 
interest renumeration or gain, all for the benefit of Broughs 
and/or Barton, to whom he owed nothing. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS MADE NO TENDER STATING THAT 
THE LOTS WERE SOLD PRIOR TO DATE OF 
TENDERING, WHICH INDICATES THAT THE 
ACTION IS ONE AT LAW FOR DAMAGES, NOT 
IN EQUITY FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
Although the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint 
that plaintiffs "have tendered the $4,999 as provided" in the 
agreement of July 29, 1974, no tender was ever made. James 
Brough testified that he had not tendered any money to Barton 
(Tr 22 line 11) and that the reason for not tendering was 
"because the lots were sold prior to the, to that date of tender-
ing." (Tr 24 line 28). The written findings of the court merely 
stated that: 
"11. That plaintiffs were willing and ready, 
at all times, to pay the Five Thousand ($5,000) 
for the improvement on said lots upon conveyance." 
This Court held in the case of Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 
538 P2d 1319 (1975) that: 
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"A tender requires that there be a bona 
fide, unconditional, offer of payment of the 
amount of money due, coupled with an actual 
production of the money or its equivalent." 
A letter from plaintiff's attorney to Barton dated- February ·4, 1977 
(Exhibit F) requests that Lots 9 and 10 be made available but 
makes no offer of payment. The street improvements were completed 
by the fall of 1977 (Tr 184) and the action was connnenced against 
Barton on October 12, 1977, yet no tender was ever made to Barton, 
Campbell or Golden West. 
Tender of payment and the conveyance are to occur 
simultaneously and are regarded as mutual and concurrent acts. 
One party cannot hold the other in default until he has himself 
properly tendered performance. (77 AmJur 2nd, Vendor and 
Purchaser 665). 
Assuming that tender was excused by Brough's belief 
that the lots were sold to others, this shows that Brough never 
intended to obtain specific performance and the action was a legal 
action for damages which as above reviewed would preclude the 
claim of part performance as a basis for such legal action. 
POINT V 
A CONTRACT REQUIRED TO BE IN WRITING 
CANNOT BE MODIFIED BY ORAL AGREEMENT 
OR UNSIGNED DOCUMENTS. 
The judgment against Campbell cannot be supported 
upon any claimed oral agreement which would tend to alter the 
written agreements and the deed between Barton and Campbell. 
Under the written agreement, June 7, 1974, and the warranty deed 
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July 18, 1974, no obligations to Broughs were assumed by 
Campbell. 
This Court held in Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt 
(supra) that notations on a check were insufficient, and stated: 
"This, plaintiff argues, is a sufficient memorandum 
in writing to modify the original contract and 
satisfy the statute of frauds. It is elementary that 
when a contract is required to be in writing, the 
same requirement applies with equal force to any 
alteration or modification thereof. More import-
antly here, any such modifying agreement must be 
sufficiently certain and unequivocal in its terms 
that the parties will understand what it is and what 
is to be done under it. Neither the check, nor the 
quoted notation thereon, make any such recitals and 
they do not meet that requirement.'' 
CONCLUSION 
Campbell at no time agreed in writing to convey lots 
to Broughs nor was there any part performance on the part of 
Barton, Brough or otherwise which would support an oral agreement 
if one had been unequivocally proved. Campbell has not profited 
whereas Barton will have profited by his failure to perform. 
Broughs have a claim and judgment against Barton for $2,000 
allowed him on the purchase price, plus damages for loss of 
anticipated bargain. 
The judgment should be reversed as to appellant, 
L. A. Campbell. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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